![]() The cost of staging a battle in a dyadic interaction ( x launching a battle against y) Px This could also be described as Δ Kxy( Dxy, Dyx) CstB ( Dxy): ![]() This is a function of relationships between the leaders as well as the actions taken. Total pool Disputed or contested Resource that will be shared by the Leaders, when both x and y are compromising Δ Kxy( Fx, Fy):Ĭhanged in dyadic relationships between x and y. The total resources in triadic interaction be Rx+ Ry+ Rz= R3 Rdyĭisputed or contested Resource share that belongs to Leader y when both x and y are compromising Rdxĭisputed or contested Resource share that belongs to Leader x when both x and y are compromising Rd The total resources in a dyadic interaction Rx+ Ry= R2 R3: Level of attack which denotes that the attack is by the coalition of leaders Z and Y on leader X Rx, Ry, Rz Level of attack where the attack is by leader Z on the coalition of leader X and Y Q( D ZY _ X): Level of attack that denotes the attack is by leader Z on leader X Q( D z _ xy): Also used as x, y, z when subscripted Q( D): Payoff to x in a triadic scenario, when there is mutual cooperation/ compromise iĭiscount rate discounting future payoffs to account for time value of payoffs X, Y, Z Payoff to x in a triadic scenario, when z is fighting with coalition of x and y S3 x: Payoff to x in a triadic scenario, when z attacks coalition of x and y, who do not fight back S3 x: Payoff to x in a triadic scenario, when the aggressors y and z independently attack a passive x S3 x: Payoff to x in a triadic scenario, when x, y and z are fighting with each other. Payoff to x in a dyadic scenario, when both x and y have compromised. Payoff to x in a dyadic scenario, when y is fighting while x has compromised S2 x: Payoff to x in a dyadic scenario, when x is fighting while y has compromised S2 x: Payoff to x in a dyadic scenario, when Both x and y are fighting. Pertains to triadic scenarios S3.1, S3.2,…, S3.6:Įach one is a triadic scenario S2 x: Dyadic scenarios are described without S2 prefix S3: Pertains to dyadic scenarios, can be considered a simplified subgame in a triadic interaction. ![]() Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Sections 3 and 4 offer two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and an effects based operations (EBO, as in Smith, Effects based operations: applying network-centric warfare in peace, crisis, and war, 2002) experiment is then run for each case. But how valid are such model collections once they are integrated together and used out-of-sample (see Sect. 1)? Section 2 compares these realistic, descriptive agents to normative rational actor theory and offers equilibria insights for conflict games. Part I of this article concentrated on internal validity of the components of such a synthetic framework-a world diplomacy game as well as the agent architecture for modeling leaders and followers in different conflicts. Military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysts are increasingly interested in having a valid system of models that span the social sciences and interoperate so that one can determine the effects that may arise from alternative operations (courses of action) in different lands.
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